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ABSTRACT
A distinguishing feature of the Indian federal fiscal system
is the "vertical imbalance" between the aggregate revenues and
expenditures of State governments. As a result of the
imbalance, State governments have to rely on the Central
government's financial assistance for a large part of their
budgetary expenditures. Thus, Center-State revenue transfers
assume major significance in Indian Center-State relations.
There are three Central institutions which make revenue
transfers to the States. This paper analyzes the policies of
one of these institutions, the Finance Commission, for the
1951-1984 period. It focuses on the magnitudes and nature of
its transfers to the States.
Finance Commission transfers are found to have increased in
magnitude relative to the other two types of Central
transfers, and as proportions of State government revenues.
They have largely been unconditional in nature, and their
inter-state distribution has been based on transparent
criteria which tend to favor poorer States. On the whole, the
Finance Commission's contributions to reducing the vertical
fiscal imbalance have been positive, and it is suggested that
the Central government should expand its role in the Center-
State revenue transfer-scheme.
Thesis Supervisor: William Wheaton
Title: Associate Professor, Urban Studies
and Economics.
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INTRODUCTION
India became a Federal Democratic Republic in 1950. The
Indian Constitution is the keystone of Indian federalism--it
lays down the framework for the interaction between the
Central and State governments. It seeks to balance the powers
and duties of the two governmental levels and establish
cooperation between them. However, Center-State relations in
India are far from perfect. In the last 30 or 40 years, the
frictions between the Center and the States seem to have
increased, particularly with the increase in the number of
States governed by non-Congress (the ruling party at the
Center) parties.1 Center-State relations have become the
subject of tremendous concern and debate among politicians,
administrators, academics, and the voting public in India.
Numerous States have submitted memoranda on the subject to the
Center. In fact, the Central government appointed a
Commission to study Center-State relations which produced no
less than a 4,900 page report in 1988.
It is the aim of this paper to study an important
financial aspect of Center-State relations, specifically, the
revenues being transferred from Central coffers for the
1 See: Anirudh Prasad. (1985. Centre-State Relations in India.
New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications.) for a description of the
major areas of contention among the Center and the States.
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budgetary needs of the States. The States depend on these
revenue transfers to a significant extent to meet their
current and capital expenditures. The paper analyzes the
contributions of the Finance Commission, an important Central
body which makes policy for specific types of Central
transfers.
The central argument of the paper is that the Finance
Commission has played a worthwhile role in providing finances
for State governments, both in terms of the magnitudes and the
nature of its transfers. The magnitudes of Finance Commission
transfers are large relative to other types of Central
financial transfers. In general, its transfers are more
acceptable to State governments because they are unconditional
and give the States autonomy in the use of funds. Moreover,
the Commission has used transparent criteria to redistribute
Central monies in an equitable manner and promote the goal of
regional equalization.
The role of the Finance Commission will be studied for
the 1951-84 period. First, the Indian federal fiscal system
will be described briefly and the rationale for Central
transfers will be provided. Second, background information on
State budgeting will be given because Central transfers differ
in their uses and budgetary classifications. Third, Finance
Commission transfers will be compared and contrasted with
8
other types of Central transfers. Finally, the evolution of
Commission policy will be studied from two angles: the overall
magnitudes of the funds it devolved to the States, and the
nature of these devolutions.
The study draws from a fairly extensive body of
literature on Indian fiscal federalism and the Finance
Commission. The Finance Commission's five-yearly reports were
found to contain much useful information on Center-State
transfers. Conversations with Indian professionals familiar
with the federal financial system also helped clarify the main
issues in Center-State revenue sharing.
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CHAPTER 1
INDIAN FISCAL FEDERALISM
This chapter provides a brief summary of the federal
financial system in India. It shows how the Constitutional
division of resources and expenditures between the Center and
States results in a "fiscal imbalance" which is remedied by
Central financial transfers to the States.
The Federal Structure
The Indian Constitution is one of the more detailed and
lengthy Constitutions in the world. Instead of providing
separate constitutions for the Union and the States, its
makers established an elaborate division of powers and duties
between the Central and State governments within a single
Constitution. They intended to guarantee each level of
government a sphere of functional responsibility and the
resources to fulfil its obligations. The foundations of
Indian federalism are thus found in three Constitutional
lists:
(A) The Union List. This is a list of subjects over which
the Central government or the Center has exclusive control,
i.e., areas of national concern--defense, external affairs,
external trade and aid, inter-state trade, industries,
railways, currency and banking, post and telegraphs, heavy
10
industry, and infrastructure. Thus, the Central legislature
(Parliament) and executive can frame laws, make policies, or
create institutions to promote development in these areas
without interference from the State governments. The States
only have recourse to the Indian judiciary if they need to
challenge Central decisions on subjects in this list.
The Union List also gives the Center the power to levy
and collect many broad-based and elastic taxes such as those
with an inter-state or industrial base. According to the
Constitutional tax-scheme, there is no overlapping between
these Central taxes and the State taxes (in theory, at least).
Central taxes are as follows: personal (non-agricultural)
income tax, corporation income tax, customs and import duties,
excise duties (excluding those on narcotics and agricultural
products), wealth (non-agricultural) tax, estate (non-
agricultural) duties, and inter-state trade taxes.
In addition to taxes, the Center derives non-tax income
of various types: administrative receipts, interest and
principal recovered on loans made to States and others,
borrowings from the public, external assistance, and profits
from public enterprises (such as the Central Railways).
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(B) The State List. This list enumerates subjects under the
exclusive control of State governments including State revenue
sources and expenditure responsibilities. According to this
list, each State has the legislative and executive power to
regulate or promote the development of agriculture and
irrigation, power, education, health, family planning, and
rural areas; the improvement of slums; and the preservation of
forests. States also are supposed to establish local
authorities (such as municipal governments) and devolve power
to them.1  They must discharge routine responsibilities in
areas such as internal law and order (police services, etc.)
and public justice. Theoretically, the Center cannot
interfere with State policies in all of the above fields and
individual States have the power to adjust their functions to
the preferences of their inhabitants.
The States are given their own taxing powers in the State
List. First, they can tax the agricultural sector through
income taxes, property taxes, land revenues, and estate
duties. In addition, they also levy the following taxes:
sales tax, registration tax, stamp duties, excise duties on
narcotics and alcoholic products, professions taxes, and motor
1 Although local governments are creatures of State
governments, they have their own budgets, may levy taxes, and
make their own rules and regulations. See: Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. 1984.
India: A Reference Annual. New Delhi.
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vehicle taxes. Non-tax revenues accrue to the States in the
following forms: Central grants, loans from various sources
such as the Central government, Central bank, public sector
financial institutions, public money and capital markets,2
and fees and user charges.
(C) The Concurrent List. As its name suggests, this list
specifies subjects under the shared control of the Center and
States. One example is economic and social planning, which
has to be conducted and implemented by both levels of
government in cooperation with each other. This is because
planning has to take into account Centrally-articulated
national priorities as well as differences in inter-state
preferences for development strategies. Other joint
governmental responsibilities are in areas where government
regulation is required such as criminal law, marriage and
divorce, trade unions, and drug production. There is only one
type of concurrent taxation--stamp duties on specific items.
In case of conflict, Central decisions are supposed to
override those of the States.
The Constitution specifies that the Center has
"residuary" power over subjects not mentioned in these three
lists. Also, since the federation includes a few Union
2 All State borrowings are controlled and regulated by the
Central government.
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territories (such as New Delhi) in addition to the States, the
Center has all the powers and duties of regulation of the
Union territories mentioned in the three lists.
The Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
The Constitutional division of expenditures and revenues
between the Center and States results in a "vertical fiscal
imbalance" which is one of the distinguishing features of the
Indian federal fiscal system. A member of the current Finance
Commission (1989), Raja Chelliah, explains the situation as
follows:
If these major taxes' are assigned to, or taken over by,
the Central government, the tax base left to the States
will become very narrow. At the same time, the
responsibilities assigned to the State governments are
considerable and with the rapid pace of urbanization and
the growing demand for public services of the kind
provided locally, the expenditures of the State
governments have been growing rapidly. These conflicting
tendencies of the revenue and expenditure sides have led
to the familiar problem of vertical fiscal imbalance, also
called the correspondence problem. This calls for a
transfer of substantial resources from the Center to the
The major taxes are the excise tax, customs duty,
corporation income tax, and personal income tax.
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States... .on a continuing basis.'
A more formal definition of the vertical fiscal imbalance
describes it as a mismatch between the aggregate current
expenditure needs of the States and their aggregate tax-
raising plus charge-raising (i.e., revenue raising) capacity.'
The Constitution provides for Centralized collections of
major taxes because they reap economies of scale in
collection. Also, Centralized collections allow the Center to
redistribute collections in favor of States with narrower tax
bases in order to achieve balanced economic and social
development (see: Chapter 3, page 1). This assignment of
major taxes to the Center decreases the tax base available to
State governments. In addition, the high rates of Central
taxes effectively limit the ability of States to raise the
rates of their own taxes. For instance, the rates of Central
income tax are higher in India than in most countries, and the
States do not have much scope for increasing their own
profession tax rates.
* Raja Chelliah. 1981. Trends and Issues in Indian Federal
Finance. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited, p. 7.
5 David King. 1984. Fiscal Tiers: The Economics of Multi-
Level Government. London: George Allen & Unwin.
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The data in Table 1.1 show the magnitude of the vertical
fiscal imbalance from the share of the States' taxes in total
Indian tax collection, the percentage of total Indian current
public expenditure made by the States, and the percentage of
the States' revenues provided by their own revenues.
TABLE 1.1
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE
(percent)
YEAR STATES' SHARE STATES' SHARE STATES' OWN
IN TAX IN CURRENT REVENUE TO TOTAL
COLLECTIONS EXPENDITURES STATE REVENUE
1960-61 33.7 57.1 69.9
1970-71 32.5 55.0 62.7
1975-76 31.9 51.2 64.7
1980-81 33.6 56.4 59.1
Sources: (i) Raja Chelliah. Trends and Issues in Indian
Federal Finance, (ii) Report of the Ninth Finance Commission
(1988), (iii) Bajaj, et al. Finance Commission and Backward
States. (iv) Tata Services Ltd. Statistical Outline of India,
(various issues).
The table shows that the share of the States in total tax
collections is generally less than 35%, whereas its share in
current account expenditures is over 50%. In fact, the
States' own revenues account for only about 60% of their total
revenues.
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The Constitution's authors were aware of the gap created
between the States' own revenues and expenditures and they
made provisions to correct this imbalance. They designed a
system for resource transfers from the financially-strong
Center to the fiscally-weak States, and created an independent
institution, the Finance Commission, to share certain Central
taxes and give grants for meeting the budgetary needs of the
States. In addition, they outlined four principles for the
transfer of resources: (i) compensation, (ii) derivation,
(iii) need, and (iv) national welfare. The compensation
criterion was used in the early 1950s to financially
compensate States for any hardships experienced as a result of
joining the federation. The derivation principle relates the
distribution of shared taxes to the contribution of individual
States to the divisible tax pool. The need factor is used to
determine the special budgetary needs of States, particularly
the poorer ones. Finally, the national welfare principle
requires that transfers promote the "efficient allocation of
resources" and establish uniform national minimum standards
for public services.'
6 As cited in: Anirudh Prasad. 1985. Centre-State Relations
in India. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF A STATE BUDGET IN INDIA
Center-State transfers in India are classified in
different ways according to the types of State expenditures
towards which they are applied. Therefore, a basic
understanding of the State budget framework is essential for
analyzing these financial flows. State budgets are divided
into current and capital accounts. The classification of
expenditures in each account is fairly complicated and merits
discussion. This chapter describes the budgetary
classifications and provides the consolidated budget for all
States for four recent years.
Budgetary Classifications
A State budget has two parts: a current account and a
capital account. As the current account is formally named the
Revenue account in India, this term will be used throughout
the paper.
Receipts on the Revenue account are those that do not
incur any repayment liability such as the State's own
revenues, Central grants financing the State Five-Year Plan,
and Central grants financing Non-Plan expenditures. Receipts
on the Capital account include domestic debt, loans from the
Center, and the State's recovery of its own loans and advances
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to various entities. In this way, State accounting separates
receipts into government "revenues" (on Revenue account) and
loans (on Capital account). The idea is that, by
appropriately matching expenditures to the receipts financing
them, fiscal imbalances and irresponsibility are minimized.
Expenditures are formally entered under either Revenue or
Capital account depending on whether they need to be financed
by revenue or capital receipts. This distinction is somewhat
artificial, since there is fungibility between State income
from the various sources.' Expenditures have to be voted
upon and approved by the State legislature before they are
formally entered into the budget.
An "object" classification2 of expenditures on Revenue
account reveals that they usually cover routine administrative
matters such as government salaries and administrative costs.
On the other hand, expenditures on Capital account usually
create assets. They are made for:
(i) the State's own investment outlay, and
(ii) State debt repayment and loans to other entities (local
governments, public sector companies, etc.).
1 Christine Wallich. 1982. State Finances in India: Studies
in State Finances. World Bank Staff Working Paper 523.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, p. 9.
2 For types of budgetary classifications: Richard Goode. 1984.
Government Finance in Developing Countries. Studies of
Government Finance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Instn.
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A "functional" classification of expenditures reveals
that both Revenue and Capital accounts have two categories:
Developmental and Non-Developmental expenditures. The former
are for developmental purposes in areas such as health,
education, irrigation, etc. The latter include spending on
civil administration, tax collection, jails, debt service,
etc. The distinction between the two categories is sometimes
arbitrary. For example, famine relief comes under the Non-
Development category, when it could also be classified as a
Development category. Figure 2.1 given below provides
examples of Developmental and Non-Developmental expenditures
for each account:
Figure 2. 1: EXPENDITURE EXAMPLES
Revenue Account Capital Account
Developmental: Education: Education:
teacher salaries school buildings
Non-Developmental: Civil Service: Civil Service:
clerical salaries municipal buildings
Finally, States have Five-Year Plan expenditures. These
are always Developmental, but can be found in either the
Revenue account or the Capital account. This is because they
are of both "capital" and "current" types and can enter
different parts of the State budget. For example, a Plan
3 Christine Wallich. 1982. State Finances in India: Revenue
Sharing. World Bank Staff Working Paper 523. Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank.
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irrigation project may be subdivided into dam construction
expenditures on Capital account, and engineer/administrative
salaries on Revenue account. Any Revenue account Plan
expenditure gets converted into a Revenue account Non-Plan
expenditure (or a "committed" expenditure) when a Plan project
is completed. The State government (without Central
assistance) bears the financing burden for such "committed"
expenditure.
21
Figure 2.2 summarizes the classification of receipts on
Revenue and Capital accounts.
Figure 2.2
CLASSIFICATION OF STATE RECEIPTS
STATE BUDGET
----------------- |--------------------
REVENUE ACCOUNT CAPITAL ACCOUNT
LoansNon-Tax
Revenue
Deposit
Funds
Other
Non-Tax
Revenues
(fees, etc.)
I------------------------------------------
Taxes on
Income
Taxes on
Commodities
Share in
Central Taxes
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Tax
Revenue
Central
Grants
Figure 2.3 summarizes the expenditure classifications
(functional, and Plan vs. Non-Plan) mentioned earlier.
Figure 2.3
CLASSIFICATION OF STATE EXPENDITURES
STATE BUDGET
-----------------------------------
REVENUE ACCOUNT
-------------
Non-Development Development
Expenditure Expenditure
CAPITAL ACCOUNT
Capital Expenditure Loans
--------------
Non-Development Development
Expenditure Expenditure
Committed
Expenditure
Recurrent Plan Other
Expenditure Development
Expenditure
Plan
Expenditure
Other
Development
Expenditure
State Plan
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Source: Christine Wallich. State Finances in India: Revenue
Sharing.
------------
----------------
Consolidated Budgetary Position of the States
Table 2.1 gives the consolidated Revenue account for all
Indian states for the four latest years.
TABLE 2.1
CONSOLIDATED BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE STATES
(Revenue Budget)
1987-88 1986-87 1985-86 1984-85
(Budget) (Revised)
(Rupees, in tens of millions)
Revenue.....................
Tax revenue.................
Taxes on income, property.
etc ....................
Of which:
Agricultural income tax
Profession Tax.........
Stamps/registration fee
Land revenue...........
Taxes on commodities, etc.
Of which:
Sales Tax..............
State excise duties....
Taxes on vehicles......
Share in Central taxes....
Non-tax revenue.............
Of which:
Grants from Center.....
Expenditure.................
Developmental...............
Social services...........
Economic services.........
Non-developmental...........
Others......................
Revenue account (net).......
. 28,747
. 1,866
. 91
. 180
. 1,104
. 482
. 17,600
. 11,557
. 2,563
. 1,280
. 9,281
. 14,030
. 7,507
. 41,884
. 27,960
. 16,103
. 11,857
. 13,502
. 422
. +893
Source: Tata
Statistics.
Services Limited, Department of Economics
.. 42,777 38,536 33,424 2, b
25,261
1,649
79
162
980
420
15,103
9,693
2,438
998
8,509
13,274
7,359
38,250
26,750
15,417
11,333
11,104
396
+286
21,811
1,484
127
145
853
353
13,067
8,429
2,052
826
7,260
11,613
6,323
32,770
23,076
13,275
9,801
9,291
402
+654
18,114
1,197
84
119
703
282
11,063
7,060
1,839
700
5,855
9,311
4,762
28,349
19,983
11,372
8,610
8,009
357
-924
Statistical Outline of India: 1988-89.
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and
The receipts section of the Revenue account in Table 2.1
shows that tax revenues are generally twice the size of non-
tax revenues. Among tax receipts, the State sales tax is the
largest revenue generator, followed by Centrally-transferred
taxes (shared taxes). Among non-tax receipts, Central grants
are over half of the total. On the expenditure side,
developmental expenditures are more than half of the total
expenditures; in particular, social service expenditures are
high relative to total developmental expenditures.
25
Table 2.2 gives the consolidated Capital account for all
Indian states for the same four years.
TABLE 2.2
CONSOLIDATED BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE STATES
(Capital Budget and Overall Position)
1987-88 1986-87 1985-86 1984-85
(Budget) (Revised)
(Rupees, in tens of millions)
Receipts...................... 13,533 12,910 13,133 10,882
Of which:
Market loans (gross)..... 1,625 1,443 1,428 1,164
Loans from Center........ 8,225 7,813 8,368 5,910
Recovery of loans and
advances................ .886 1,142 809 1,030
Small savings, provident
funds, etc. (net)...... 1,213 1,132 971 933
Reserve funds (net)...... 581 455 501 348
Deposits & advances(net). 491 685 700 616
Disbursements.................. 14,946 14,141 12,099 11,397
Developmental.................... 7,023 6,294 5,355 4,788
Social services............... 1,089 1,022 744 642
Economic services............. 5,934 5,272 4,611 4,146
Non-developmental............... 246 241 98 124
Discharge of internal debt.... 409 395 503 597
Loan repayments to Center..... 2,928 2.,898 2,611 2,330
Loans & advances................ 4,362 4,287 3,530 3,395
Others........................ -21 26 2 164
Capital account (net)......... -1,413 -1,231 +1,034 -514
Overall balance.................. -520 -945 +1,688 -1,438
Source: Tata Services Limited,
Statistics. Statistical Outline of
rtment of Economics and
India: 1988-89.
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The receipts section of the Capital account in Table 2.2
shows that Central loans to the States (for Plan projects,
etc.) are the largest source of funds. These loans are
normally given at "preferential" or below-market rates of
interest.' Market loans (State bond issues), and small
savings loans (deposits from post-office savings schemes,
etc.) are also important. On the disbursements side, amounts
for developmental schemes are between half and one third of
total disbursements. The next largest capital account
disbursements are loans and advances which are made by the
States to local bodies, public sector entities, etc. Finally,
loan repayments to the Center for capital project loans also
constitute significant levels of expenditure.
* Government of India. 1978. Report of the Seventh Finance
Commission.
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CHAPTER 3
CENTER-STATE REVENUE TRANSFERS
Central transfers to the States constitute a large part
of the use of Central revenues. This chapter discusses the
three main types of transfers that have been used during the
1951-84 period and their relative importance. It shows that
the level of transfers effected by the Finance Commission have
a significant impact on State finances.
Types of Revenue Transfers
The Central transfer system is supposed to serve a dual
purpose:
(i) to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance which arises
because the Indian Constitution created a centralized
collection system for major taxes (excise duties, customs
duties, and income taxes). It did so for reasons of economic
efficiency and social equity. For instance, Centralized
collection is administratively effective and it finances
Central implementation of national policies and economic
plans. At the same time, the Constitution framers recognized
the vertical imbalance problem and provided for its correction
through Center-State transfers.
(ii) to achieve balanced economic development through the
redistribution of resources in favor of backward and poor
States.
28
The four Constitutional principles of compensation,
derivation, need, and national welfare (Chapter 1) underlie
the formulation of these two objectives. Central revenue
sharing is commonly subdivided into three categories:
(i) transfers recommended by the Finance Commission, a
statutory body appointed by the President of India,
(ii) transfers made by the Planning Commission, an extra-
constitutional organization appointed by the Central
government, and
(iii) Discretionary Transfers made by Central ministries
and the Reserve Bank of India (the country's central bank).
Finance Commission Transfers
The Constitution of India states that a Finance
Commission should be created once every five years by the
President of India (the Constitutional Head of State) to
review State finances. The President provides the Commission
with the "terms of reference" for its work. The Commission
makes recommendations on the amounts and inter-state
distribution of two forms of Central transfers: devolved (or
shared) taxes, which are five Central taxes that are shared
with the States, and grants which are given for special
budgetary needs of the States. Finance Commission
recommendations become Central government policy on being
approved by the President and Parliament.
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The Finance Commission's role1 has been interpreted by
the President and the Central government in various ways.
During the period of study (1951-84), the Center's views on
the Commission's role changed quite drastically. It began by
suggesting that the Commission transfer revenues which could
be applied towards any expenditure on State current accounts
(for both Plan and Non-Plan expenditures). Within a few
years, it began confining the Finance Commission transfers to
the Non-Plan portion of the Revenue account so that the
Planning Commission became the sole coordinator of transfers
for Plan purposes.
Finance Commission transfers were (and still are)
extremely important in the scheme of Center-State revenue
transfers, particularly since the Commission has a certain
amount of discretion in increasing the volume of such
transfers. Its financial awards usually constitute at least
30% of the total transfers during a Five-Year Plan period. In
fact, Finance Commission transfers increased to over 40% of
total transfers from 1974 onwards.
The amounts and inter-state distribution of Finance
Commission transfers have important implications for State
Plan finances. Its transfers result in Revenue budget
surpluses for some States. As the Planning Commission
' See Appendix I for Constitutional provisions affecting the
Commission's work.
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looks at the size of the surplus in determining the allowable
size of a State Plan size, a State with a large surplus,
therefore, can design a larger Plan. Accordingly, an
interesting political game is played by State governments. On
the one hand, they try to impress the Finance Commission that
they are "poor" and need more resources. On the other hand,
they try to convince the Planning Commission that they have
"adequate" funds for additional Plan projects.
The Finance Commission influences State finances in
another important way. As mentioned above, it makes two types
of transfers: devolved taxes and grants. Devolved taxes are
unconditional transfers which can be used at the discretion of
recipient States. Grants are either unconditional or
conditional (conditional transfers have to be used for some
activity specified by the Central government). If the
Commission increases the amounts of devolved taxes and
unconditional grants relative to conditional grants, States
will tend to have greater control over the use of awarded
funds.
Planning Commission Transfers
Planning is on the Concurrent List of the Constitution.
While the National Planning Commission articulates overall
priorities and formulates a Central Five-Year Plan, the State
governments formulate their own State Five-Year Plans, after
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consulting the Planning Commission. The State Planning
process involves considerable Center-State bargaining which is
arbitrated by the Planning Commission. The size of a State
Plan is approved by the Planning Commission after it considers
factors such as the magnitude of the State Revenue budget
surplus, Center-State transfers, etc.
The Planning Commission channels six types of financial
assistance for State Plans. The first is called "Normal Plan
Assistance." It is linked to an automatic formula, and gives
the States unconditional control over the use of these funds.2
It was instituted in 1969, in place of an ad-hoc Plan
assistance scheme.
The other five types of Planning Commission assistance
give the Center far more discretion with respect to the
amounts and inter-state distribution of resources. Advance
Plan Assistance is used to fill ex-ante yearly plan "gaps" or
deficits. The next three types are for specific regional
development purposes and go to hill areas, tribal areas, and
the Northeast States. The last form of Central Plan transfer
is matching assistance (loan or grant) for States that
implement externally-aided projects.
2 For most states, 30% of this block assistance is in grant
form and 70% is in loan form.
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Discretionary Transfers
Central transfers which are of a non-statutory and non-
State Plan3 nature are referred to as discretionary budgetary
transfers.. They are given in the form of either grants or
loans. Generally, their amounts and inter-state distribution
are not governed by any set formulae or norms,' and they are
initiated by Central government ministries or agencies.
The most important discretionary transfer is approved
jointly by Central ministries and the Planning Commission.'
It funds Centrally-devised schemes to be implemented by State
governments. These schemes are part of the National Five-Year
Plan because they have special characteristics such as
spillover effects. Implementing State governments are given
both matching and non-matching grants for Central schemes,
which have been steadily rising relative to other transfers.
Existing restrictions limiting their financing to 1/6 or 1/7
of Normal Plan assistance are usually ignored.
3 Finance Commission transfers are "statutory" and Planning
Commission transfers are State Plan transfers.
* For their definition, see: K.K. George. 1986.
"Discretionary Budgetary Transfers: A Review." Economic and
Political Weekly. Vol. XXI, No. 46 (November 15), pp.1993-98.
S Small savings schemes are distributed on a pre-set basis.
6 Some authors categorize it as a Planning Commission transfer
(Thimmaiah, Bajaj et al.).
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Two other discretionary transfers have a major impact on
State finances. The first is drawn from the pool of small
savings deposits of households such as post-office savings
deposits. Generally, two-thirds of the net proceeds of the
small savings pool is given to the States in the form of
loans. The second is the category of miscellaneous Central
loans which effectively give the States more financial
discretion. For instance, the States are provided overdraft
facilities by the Central bank which acts as their banker. An
overdraft is supposed to be a temporary accommodation loan for
the State to meet a financial contingency. However, many
States have used the overdraft facility to access considerable
sums of money, and effectively evade the assistance norms
developed by the Finance and Planning Commissions.
Unauthorized overdrafts have become a serious problem--they
increased from minuscule levels in 1951 to Rs. 17,500 million
in January 1984.'
7 G. Thimmaiah. 1985. Burning Issues in Centre-State
Financial Relations. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, p.
83.
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Transfers Compared
A comparison of the relative amounts of transfers
effected by the three major types of sources shows that the
Finance Commission's role expanded significantly between 1951
and 1984. Table 3.1 gives the percentage of transfers
accounted for by each source.
TABLE 3.1
CENTER-STATE REVENUE TRANSFERS FROM THREE SOURCES, 1951-1984
(percent)
PLAN PERIOD FINANCE
COMMISSION
I
II
III
ANN-
UAL
IV
V
VI
1951-56
1956-61
1961-66
1966-69
1969-74
1974-79
1979-84
31.2
32.0
28.4
33.3
35.9
43.0
41.0
PLANNING DISCRETIONARY REAL PER-
COMMISSION SOURCES CAPITA TOTAL
(Rs.)
24.5 44.3 190.2
36.9 31.1 402.2
44.9 26.7 501.0
33.0 33.6 357.3
23.4
30.5
29.3
40.7
26.4
29.7
584.3
566.9
811.7
1 Rs. 15.5 = US$ 1, as of March 1989.
Note: 1980 was the base year used for estimating real per-
capita amounts.
Sources: (i) IMF International Financial Statistics (1988),
(ii) Report of the Seventh Finance Commission (1978),
(iii) K.K. George. "Discretionary Budgetary Transfers:
A Review." (for periods V and VI).
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The table shows that Finance Commission transfers were above
35% of the total during the last three Plan periods. Planning
Commission amounts varied from a high of almost 45% in period
III to a low of 23% in period IV. Discretionary transfers
showed similar variations to the Planning Commission ones. In
the last period, the two latter types constituted about 30%
each of total transfers.
This chapter has shown that Finance Commission transfers
are important elements of State finances for a number of
reasons. First, they already constitute a major portion of
total Central revenue-sharing with the States. Second, the
Finance Commission is a statutory body which is meant to be
fairly independent of the Central government, even though it
receives its terms of reference from the President. In
contrast, the Planning Commission is an extra-Constitutional
body that is less independent of the Central government, and
Discretionary funding agencies are Central government
departments. Third, Finance Commission transfers have an
impact on the size of State Plans. Finally, the States
usually prefer Finance Commission funds to other types because
the States are free to use them for any purpose. For all
these reasons, a study of the historical evolution of the
Finance Commission's policies is justified and would shed some
light on its contribution to federal finance.
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CHAPTER 4
FINANCE COMMISSION POLICIES
This chapter analyzes the evolution of Finance Commission
policy (1951 to 1984) from two perspectives :
(i) the magnitudes of the taxes and grants transferred to
the 22 Indian States,' and
(ii) the nature of its tax and grant transfers,
specifically, the manner in which they are distributed among
States.
The data show that the real per-capita transfer amounts have
increased significantly, with most of the increase occurring
in tax devolutions. Moreover, the inter-state distribution of
taxes has been based on transparent formulae developed by each
Commission and has redistributed funds in favor of poorer
States. Although most grants have been used to fill State
Revenue budget gaps remaining after tax devolution, some have
been used to equalize the standards of specific public
services across States.
' Note: Since the period of study, the number of Indian States
has increased to 25.
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Constitutional and Legal Framework for Policy
Constitutionally and legally, the Finance Commission is
independent of the Central government. (Appendix I contains
the Constitutional articles that affect the Commission's
working.) However, in practice, the Center prescribes
guidelines for the Commission's work through its "terms of
reference," which have had the following characteristics in
the past:
(i) they have restricted the Finance Commission's
attention to the Non-Plan Revenue budgets of States,
(ii) they have outlined various factors to be considered
in distributing grants, such as the size of Revenue budget
gaps, and inter-state inequalities in public services, and
(iii) since the Seventh Commission, they have indicated
that the factors considered in grant allocation should also be
considered for tax devolution.
During the period of study, seven Finance Commissions were
appointed by the President of India. Generally, since these
Commissions worked within the scope of their terms of
reference, their recommendations were accepted by the
President and Parliament.
Commission Policy: Overall Magnitudes of Transfers
This section shows that, between 1951 and 1984, of the
two types of Finance Commission transfers, shared taxes became
the dominant form of transfer, while grants became a
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"residual" form of assistance used mainly to cover budgetary
deficits.
Devolved Taxes and Grants
Between 1951 and 1984, the level of devolved taxes
increased significantly but the level of grants varied
considerably. Graphs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 present yearly
devolved taxes and grants as percentages of Central Revenues,
State Revenues, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1955-
1984. They are meant to indicate broad trends in transfer-
giving rather than to present detailed information on yearly
flows.2
Graph 4.1 shows that devolved taxes as a percentage of
Central Revenues (revenues in the Revenue account) increased
from approximately 13% in 1955-56 to approximately 27% in
1983-84. Similarly, Graph 4.2 shows that devolved taxes as a
percentage of State Revenues increased from roughly 13% in
1955-56 to roughly 22% in 1983-84. Graph 4.3 depicts the
increasing trend in devolved taxes as a percentage of GDP--
from 0.7% in 1955-56 to 2.7% in 1983-84. All three graphs
point out the dramatic increase in devolution caused by the
Seventh Commission's recommendations (1979-84).
2 Note: (i) The data used to generate them are contained in
Appendix II, and
(ii) Upto 1965-66, data were only available for two years:
1955-56, and 1960-61.
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Figure 4.1
FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS
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In contrast to tax-devolution, grant-giving showed no
consistent increase. First, grants as a percentage of Central
Revenues hovered between 4% and 6% during the period. In
fact, they declined to 2% of Central Revenues in the Seventh
Commission period (1979-84). Second, grants as a percentage
of State Revenues fluctuated considerably, from 4% to 7%, and
declined to roughly 2% at the end of the period. Finally,
grants as a percentage of GDP hardly displayed any consistent
trend.
The increasing importance of tax devolution is
highlighted by comparing the proportion of total transfers
accounted for by taxes and grants. Table 4.1 (next page)
shows that the percentage of devolved taxes to total transfers
increased from 77% in Plan I to 92% in Plan VI. It also shows
that the real per-capita amounts of transfers (taxes and
grants) increased significantly, from Rs. 59.4 during Plan I
to Rs. 338.9 during Plan VI.
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TABLE 4.1
COMMISSION TRANSFERS TO THE STATES, BY TYPE, 1951-1984
PLAN PERIOD DEVOLVED
TAXES
(%)
GRANTS TOTAL REAL PER-
AMOUNT CAPITA TOTAL
(%) (Millions of Rs.) (Rs.)
I 1951-56 77 23 4,470 59.4
II 1956-61 73 27 9,180 128.7
III 1961-66 75 25 15,900 142.2
ANNUAL 1966-69 72 28 17,820 119.1
IV 1969-74 84 16 54,210 209.8
V 1974-79 75 25 110,480 247.8
VI 1979-84 92 8 228,880 338.9
Note: 1980 was the base year used for estimating real per-
capita amounts.
Sources: (i) IMF International Financial Statistics (1988), p
410, (ii) Report of the Eighth Finance Commission (1984): p.
156, (iii) Statistical Abstract of India (various issues).
The two most important devolved taxes are the income tax
and excise duties.' Table 4.2 (next page) shows that their
combined share in transferred taxes was high during the 1951-
84 period. While they accounted for almost all of the tax
transfers during Plan I, they constituted between 80% and 89%
of the tax transfers in subsequent periods. In real per-
' Note: (i) only personal income tax is shared with the
States. (ii) the excise tax is a producer-level tax, levied
on over 100 commodities manufactured and produced within the
country.
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FINANCE
.
capita terms, the two taxes increased steadily from Rs. 45.5
in Plan I to Rs. 156.5 in Plan V. The table also shows that
the real per-capita income tax and excise duty devolution
jumped sharply to Rs. 278.7 in Plan VI. This also can be
deduced from two earlier findings: (i) devolved taxes rose
dramatically as a percentage of GDP in Plan VI, and (ii)
income taxes and excise duties form the major part of devolved
taxes.
TABLE 4.2
FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS: INCOME TAX AND EXCISE DUTIES
PLAN PERIOD INCOME & TOTAL
EXCISE DEVOLVED
DEVOLN.S TAXES
(1) (2)
(Millions of Rs.)
I 1951-56 3,420 3,440
II 1956-61 5,280 6,680
III 1961-66 9,530 11,960
ANN- 1966-69 11,350 12,820
UAL
IV 1969-74 39,880 45,620
V 1974-79 69,790 82,750
VI 1979-84 188,210 211,770
(1) AS
% OF
(2)
(%)
99.4
79.0
79.7
88.5
87.4
84.3
88.9
REAL (1)
PER-
CAPITA
(Rs.
45.5
74.0
85.3
75.9
154.3
156.5
278.7
RATIO OF
INCOME TO
EXCISE TAX
DEVOLUTIONS,
4.34
2.45
1.39
0.81
1.16
0.88
0.38
Note: 1980 was the base year used for estimating real per-
capita amounts.
Sources: (i) IMF International Financial Statistics (1988):
410, (ii) Report of the Eighth Finance Commission (1984):
pp. 156-57.
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It is interesting to note that the ratio of income tax to
excise tax devolutions decreased from a high of 4.34 in 1951-
56 to 0.38 in 1979-84. Two factors probably explain the
variation:
(i) the scope of excise devolutions increased (details
are in the next paragraph), and
(ii) Central excise collections rose spectacularly
relative to income tax collections, due to reasons such as the
higher buoyancy of excise duties and collection problems
connected with the income tax.
Since 1951-56, the Commission increased the percentage of
Central excise duties and income tax devolved to the States as
a whole (see: Appendix III for historical recommendations).
The percentage of income tax given to the States steadily
increased from 55% in 1951-56 to 85% in 1979-84. Similarly,
whereas 40% of excise duties on only three commodities were
given to the States in 1951-56, 40% of excise duties on all
commodities were given in 1979-84. The rise in the devolved
percentages of these two taxes reflect the Finance
Commission's recognition.that the States need buoyant revenue
transfers to keep pace with economic growth and their
increasing expenditure needs. In the past, the Indian income
tax proved to be a relatively stable source of revenue, a
major portion of which could be transferred to the States.
Excise duties have been fairly buoyant and are major revenue
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generators for the Center. A.K. Agarwal has observed:
There has been a remarkable expansion in the revenue from
excise taxation in recent years partly as a result of the
increase in production, the raising of the rates of old
excise duties, and partly by bringing new products under the
purview of excise taxation.4
Table 4.3 presents some historical data on Central collections
of income tax and excise duties as percentages of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). It shows that income taxes have
decreased from 1.22 to 0.98 percent of GDP between 1969-70 and
1986-87. In contrast, excise taxes have increased from 4.14
percent to 4.94 percent. Thus, excise duties have been
buoyant sources of revenue for the Central government and were
used more heavily for Central revenue sharing in recent
periods.
Grants were generally used as "residuary" forms of
assistance, i.e. to fill the budgetary gaps remaining after
the usual tax devolutions. The determination of grant amounts
is discussed in the next section.
* A.K. Agarwal. 1987. Problems of Indian Fiscal Structure.
New Delhi: Mittal Publications, p. 35.
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TABLE 4.3
CENTRAL TAX COLLECTIONS AS PERCENTAGES
(percent)
GDP INCOME TAXES EXCISE DUTIESGDP
(Million Rs.)
368,500
478,700
740,800
1,075,400
1,775,900
2,617,300
2,927,900
INCOME TAXES
AS % OF GDP
1.22
1.22
1.64
1.25
0.94
0.92
0.98
EXCISE DUTIES
AS % OF GDP
4.14
5.17
5.19
5.59
5.70
4.94
4.94
Sources: (i) IMF International Financial Statistics (1988): p.
410, (ii) Tata Services Limited, Statistical Outline
of India.: (various issues).
Commission Policy: Nature of Transfers
This section first shows that the inter-state
distribution of devolved taxes has been based on transparent
criteria such as the percentage of population and individuals
below the poverty line in each State. Next, it analyzes the
impact of the devolution patterns from the point of view of
income redistribution, and shows that the poorer states have
benefited relative to the richer ones. Finally, it shows that
the main criterion used to determine the amounts of grants
needed by each State is the fiscal "gap" on the Revenue
account.
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OF GDP
YEAR
1969-70
1972-73
1975-76
1979-80
1982-83
1985-86
1986-87
The Inter-State Distribution of Devolved Taxes
The inter-state distribution of tax transfers is of
special concern to States because tax transfers are
unconditional and give the States more fiscal latitude than
discretionary transfers. A State may wind up with a Revenue
surplus after tax devolution. (States that have deficits after
devolution receive grants-in-aid to cover gaps) and can use
it for purposes such as developmental expenditure. The
Finance Commission also can design the tax devolution pattern
to redistribute incomes in favor of poorer States. As the
income tax and excise duties are the main portion of devolved
taxes, this section focuses on them.
Income Tax: As mentioned earlier, the States' share in income
tax has risen over the years (Appendix III). From 1951 to
1984, two criteria were used (with marginal variations in
weights) for the inter-state allocation of income tax: State
population and State income tax contribution. The Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Commissions gave 90% and 10% weights to
these criteria respectively.
Appendix IV presents data on Finance Commission income
tax devolutions by State (excluding Sikkim, which does not
receive tax devolutions) for 1979-84. A simple linear
regression was used to relate State devolved income taxes
(DIT) to three variables: 1981 population (P), income tax
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contributions (ITC), and 1983 per-capita State Domestic
Product (PCSDP). The estimated equation is:
DIT= -61.12 + 71.52 (P) + 0.06 (ITC) + 0.03 (PCSDP)
(t=44.1) (t=5.51) (t=0.42)
R = 0.99
N = 21
The population and tax contribution coefficients are positive
and significantly different from zero, but the per-capita
State Domestic Product coefficient is non-significant. These
results confirm that population was the key variable
influencing the inter-state distribution of income taxes.
Excise Duties: The States' share in excise duties also rose
dramatically (Appendix III) between 1951-56 and 1979-84. The
first six Commissions used population and backwardness as
criteria for inter-state allocations, giving greater weight to
population. The Seventh Commission used four factors having
equal weights:
(i) population,
(ii) inverse of per-capita State Domestic Product,
(iii) percentage of people below the poverty line, and
(iv) a "revenue equalization" formula.5
s See: Report of the Seventh Finance Commission (1978): p. 87.
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Appendix V presents data on excise duty devolutions to
each State (excluding Sikkim) for 1979-84 and the results of a
simple linear regression of State devolved excise duties (DED)
on 1981 population (P), 1983 per-capita State Domestic Product
(PCSDP), and 1983 poverty percentage (POV) of each State. The
estimated equation is:
DED= 3523.67 + 209.12 (P) - 1.77 (PCSDP) + 572.68 (POV)
(t=16.33) (t=-4.30) (t=0.17)
R = 0.98
N = 21
The equation shows that the coefficient for population is
positive and significantly non-zero, and the coefficient for
per-capita State Domestic Product is negative and also
statistically significant. The R2 is 0.98 which signifies a
good fit and implies that the key factors influencing
devolutions are population and per-capita State Domestic
Product.
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Total Devolved Taxes: It is useful to ascertain the key
variables influencing overall tax transfers. Appendix VI
presents the data and results of a simple linear regression of
total devolved taxes (TDT) per State on 1981 State population
(P), 1983 per-capita State Domestic Product (PCSDP), and 1983
poverty percent (POV). The estimated equation is:
TDT = 224.75 + 283.53 (P) - 0.37 (PCSDP) + 2143.84 (POV)
(t=40.72) (t=-1.65) (t=1.14)
R = 0.99
N = 21
The results show that the coefficient for population is
positive and significantly non-zero. The coefficient for per-
capita State Domestic Product, in contrast, is negative but
not significantly non-zero. The value of its sign indicates
that the strongly negative relation between excise devolutions
and per-capita State Domestic Product dominates the
regression. This is consistent with our expectations, since
the ratio of devolved income tax to excise duties was only
0.38 during this period (Chapter 4, Table 4.2). The results
also show that the poverty percent variable has limited
explanatory power. The R2 for the regression is extremely
high (0.99), confirming that population is the main criterion
for the inter-state total tax distribution.
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Income Redistribution Impact of Tax Devolutions
It is often claimed that Finance Commission transfers
(taxes and grants included) have a regressive or non-
significant redistributive impact (Gulati & George,
Chelliah).' It is argued that the per-capita transfers to
low-income States are usually less than those to middle and
high-income ones. Since devolved taxes account for such a
high percentage of total transfers, it follows that per-capita
devolved tax transfers also have a regressive impact. The
latter deduction is only supported by the facts if per-capita
tax devolutions are considered in isolation--if population is
the main criterion for inter-state tax distribution (and it is
a scaling factor), then it would appear that per-capita tax
transfers do not favor poor States. However, if Central tax
collections from each State are factored into the analysis,
the inter-state distribution of taxes is seen to be highly
progressive. The comparison of collections per State with
I Chelliah's study relates the per-capita Finance Commission
transfers to the per-capita incomes of the States in a double-
log regression model of the following form:
log F = a + b*log (Y)
where: F = Finance Commission transfer per State
Y = Per-capita income of State
The regression coefficient (b) gives the constant income
elasticity of the transfers. The coefficients for three
periods were calculated (the Third Plan, the Annual Plans, and
the Fourth Plan) and found to be negative. Since they were
not statistically significant even at a 10% level of
significance, the findings were inconclusive.
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devolutions per State is justified for two reasons:
(i) since India has a very progressive income tax system
plus excise duties are producer-level taxes, tax collections
are higher in rich States, and
(ii) even though the Constitution does not provide for
it, the States could levy the same taxes instead of the
Center.
The estimation of the net elasticity of devolutions minus
collections indicates the true impact of the inter-state
income tax distribution. Since data on income tax collections
by State are easily available, the analysis can be conducted
on income tax collections and devolutions. Unfortunately,
data on excise duty collections are not widely available. The
statewise breakdown of excise collections has not been
published in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget of the
Central Government, probably because it is difficult to
compile the data. On the one hand, the excise collection
breakdowns which are made by the Central Board of Excises for
various points ("collectorate" cities) are not equivalent to
State breakdowns. On the other hand, even if the data on
State collections were available, they would have to be
adjusted for differences between the legal points of
collection of excise (producer-level) taxes and points of
economic incidence. Since the data have not yet been
compiled, the distributional effect of excise devolutions
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cannot be ascertained. However, it can be hypothesized that
the net effect is progressive because (i) excise collections
are likely to be higher in rich States, i.e., those with
higher levels of production, and (ii) "backwardness" (as
measured by factors such as State Domestic Product) is given a
large weight in excise devolutions.
Separate log-log regressions of income tax collections
per capita (CPC), and income tax devolutions per capita (DPC)
on per-capita State Domestic Product (PCSDP) are given in
Appendix VII. They cover the 1979-84 period. The following
equations were estimated:
(i) Collections equation:
log (CPC) = -16.91 + 2.48 log (PCSDP)
(t=3.88)
R = 0.44
N = 21
(ii) Devolutions equation:
log (DPC) = + 1.33 + 0.18 log (PCSDP)
(t=1.93)
R2 = 0.16
N = 21
The first equation shows that collections are significantly
elastic with respect to income--the coefficient is +2.48 and
statistically significant, and the R2 is reasonably high. The
second equation indicates that tax devolutions are fairly
income-inelastic--the coefficient is 0.18 and statistically
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significant (the explanatory power of the equation is limited-
-R 2 is only 0.16). The net elasticity of income tax
devolutions is indicated by the following equation:
Net Elasticity = Elasticity of Devolutions with respect to
Income
minus
Elasticity of Collections with respect to
Income
= (0.18) - (2.48)
= - 2.30
These results show that the net effect of income tax transfers
is progressive because the net elasticity of income tax
devolutions with respect to per-capita SDP is negative and its
absolute magnitude is greater than one.
The Inter-State Distribution of Grants
Finance Commission grants are of two types: block grants
and specific grants. Block grants are used to fill the
Revenue account deficit gaps of States, after adding tax
devolutions to revenue calculations. Hence, if a Commission's
tax awards reduced the number of States with post-devolution
deficits, it needed to make fewer block grants. Specific
grants are given for special purposes such as infrastructure
upgradation in selected States. Their amounts are usually
less than block amounts.
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The criteria used for determining the amounts and inter-
state distribution of grants were tested by a simple linear
regression of total grants given to each State (TGT) on the
1981 State population (P), 1983 per-capita State Domestic
Product (PCSDP), 1983 poverty percent (POV), and the Revenue
account deficit (RAD) for the five-year period. (Data and
results are given in Appendix VIII.) The estimated equation
is:
TGT = 371.39 + 9.39(P) - 0.19(PCSDP) - 346.38(POV) + 1.1O(RAD)
(t=4.41) (t=-2.84) (t=-0.65) (t=20.78)
R2 = 0.98
N = 21
The results show that the coefficients for population, per-
capita State Domestic Product, and the Revenue account deficit
are statistically significant. While total grants are
positively related to population and the Revenue account
deficit, they are negatively related to per-capita SDP.
When yearly per-capita grants (PCGT) are regressed on the
same dependent variables as above, the estimated equation is:
PCGT = -1203.91 -6.07(P) +0.36(PCSDP) +1923.43(POV) +1.18(RAD)
(t=-0.40) (t=0.76) (t=0.51) (t=3.11)
R2 = 0.53
N = 21
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These results show that the revenue account deficit is the
only significant factor at work on a per-capita basis. The R2
of 0.53 implies a reasonably good fit.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that Center-State transfers are a
crucial component of State finances. First, they help to
correct the vertical fiscal imbalance between States' own
revenues and expenditures. Chapter 1 showed that the States
receive approximately 60% of their revenues in the form of
their own revenues and the rest from the Central government.
Second, Central revenue transfers have the potential to reduce
inter-state disparities in the levels of public services.
It was seen that the Finance Commission transfer
mechanism is a key part of the federal financial system.
Finance Commission transfers are important to the States not
only because they are above 30% of total transfers, but also
because of their special characteristics relative to other
transfer forms (especially discretionary ones):
(i) they are largely unconditional sums of money, given
in the form of taxes and block grants, which the States can
use for any expenditure,
(ii) they are distributed among the States on the basis
of transparent and clearly-defined criteria, and
(iii) they are distributed in a progressive manner that
benefits the poorer states relative to the richer ones.
In contrast, discretionary transfers are usually conditional
or given for specific projects. They are not distributed
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between the States on the basis of clearly-stated criteria and
studies indicate that they arbitrarily favor States that have
political clout with the ruling party at the Center. For
these reasons, the State governments tend to prefer receiving
Finance Commission transfers to discretionary ones.1 Finance
Commission transfers also have an important impact upon the
allowable sizes of State Plans (Chapter 3).
The share of resources devolved to the States by the
Finance Commission expanded relative to the shares transferred
by the Planning Commission and Discretionary sources in the
last Plan period. In the light of the characteristics of
Finance Commission tax devolutions and grants, it would be
preferable if the Central government increased the Finance
Commission's share in future. During the period of study
(1951-84), the Finance Commission was restricted to making
transfers for only the Non-Plan Revenue accounts of the State
budgets. Only very recently, in 1989, it has been asked to
consider the Plan Revenue account needs of the States as well.
This is a laudable change in the Central guidelines for its
workings.
1 K.K. George. 1986. "Discretionary Budgetary Transfers: A
Review." Economic and Political Weekly. p. 1993.
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The role and functioning of the Finance Commission should
be examined carefully, after taking into account the recent
trend of increasing fiscal dependence of the States on the
Center. This necessitates looking at the relationship between
all three types of Center-State revenue transfers and State
expenditures. On the revenue side, the aggregate amounts of
transfers should be assessed with regard to their ability to
keep up with State expenditure needs. On the expenditure
side, State expenditures should be scrutinized and the "fiscal
responsibility" criterion should be applied to all aspects of
the transfer-design process. (In the past, the Finance
Commission considered factors such as "efficiency and economy
in administration", and "tax effort" only in developing grant
formulae.) This is especially important because the
"overdraft" form of discretionary transfer, obtained from the
Central Bank, overrides the transfer norms developed by the
Finance and Planning Commissions (Chapter 3). It is
imperative that the Finance Commission convene a meaningful
discussion on these issues between different groups such as
academics and government officials at the Central and State
levels.
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APPENDIX I
Article 280 of the Indian Constitution mandates the
President to appoint a Finance Commission once every five
years. It is the Commission's duty to make recommendations
to the President on three matters: (i) the allocation between
the Center and the States of the net proceeds of taxes which
"have to, or may be," divided between them (these taxes are
specified in other Constitutional articles), and the inter-
state distribution of the States' share, (ii) the principles
which should govern the Central government's Grants-in Aid of
the revenues of the States, and (iii) any other matter
referred to the Commission by the President, "in the interests
of sound finance."
Article 280 empowers the Parliament to legislate on the
Commission's (i) procedure and powers, and (ii) appointment
and qualifications of members. In 1951, Parliament passed the
Finance Commission Act. It states that "The Commission shall
determine their procedure and in the performance of their
functions shall have all the powers of a Civil court..."1 In
other words, the Commission has a quasi-judicial status--it
can summon witnesses, requisition any public document, etc.
The Finance Commission Act also prescribes qualifications for
I The Finance Commission Act (1951), as reproduced in the
report of the Eighth Finance Commission (1984).
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members; they should either have qualifications of High Court
judges, or have experience/expert knowledge of public
finance/economics.
Article 270 provides for the compulsory sharing of taxes
that are levied and collected by the Center with the States.
Specifically, these are income taxes (except those on
agricultural income). The article's definition of income tax
explicitly excludes (i) the corporation tax,2 or (ii) any
surcharges, which can be levied by the Center for its uses, on
the income tax. The article empowers the Finance Commission
to make recommendations on the percentage of income taxes to
be devolved to the States as well as their inter-state
distribution. If the President is satisfied with them, he/she
implements the recommendations by order. Thus, Parliament is
not directly concerned with income tax devolution.
Article 272 deals with the taxes levied and collected by
the Center that may be shared with the States: Central excise
duties. The President "authorizes" the Finance Commission to
make recommendations on the types and percentages of excise
2 The exclusion of corporation tax is very significant from a
decentralization point of view. According to the Far Eastern
Economic Review (April 6, 1989), corporation tax revenues
increased from Rs. 43.8 crores (1 Crore=10 million) in 1953 to
Rs. 2,339 crores in 1983. Over the same period, income tax
revenues increased from Rs. 143 crores to Rs. 1,563 crores.
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duties to be transferred, and their inter-state distribution.
Parliament has the sole power to implement the recommendations
through appropriate legislation.
Based on Article 280's provision for "sound finance," the
President also authorizes the Commission to consider taxes
levied and collected by the Center but entirely assigned to
the States. Article 269 covers two of the three tax types:
estate duties (except those on agricultural land), and taxes
on railway fares.' The third type--additional excise duties--
is covered in an intergovernmental agreement. The Finance
Commission recommends the inter-state distribution of these
three tax types. As in the case of Central excise duties
(Article 272), recommendations have to be implemented by
Parliament.
Article 275 provides for grants-in-aid of the revenues of
States, which are to be provided under Parliamentary law or
via Presidential Order. Presidential grants are usually
referred to the Finance Commission, which recommends their
amounts and inter-state distribution.
I Recently, taxes on railway fares have been shared in a
different way--a flat grant amount is given to the States.
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APPENDIX II--Table A.II
FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS, 1955-83
(Millions of Rupees)
Devolved Total Central State
Year Taxes Grants Transfers GDP (1) as 2 (2) as 2 Revenues *C1) as 2 (2) as 2 Revenues (1) as 2 (2) as 2
(1) C2) (3) Cl) of C4) of C4) (5) of (5) of CS) (6) of (6) of C6)
1955
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1971
1975
1976
197?
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
710
1,650
2,760
3,730
4,170
4,920
6,220
7,550
9,440
10,670
11,710
12,210
15,990
16,900
18,060
19,560
31,040
37,890
42,570
46,390
50,880
210
630
880
1,690
1,650
1,660
1,790
1,710
1,680
1,770
1,640
5,060
5,190
5,160
6,000
6,320
2,710
2,980
3,090
1,150
4,150
980
2,280
3,610
5,420
5,820
6,580
8,010
9,260
11,120
12,140
13,380
17,300
21,180
22,060
21,060
25,880
36,780
40,870
15,660
50,540
55,030
102,600
150,200
241,100
276,600
322,900
332,800
368,500
402,600
133,600
178,700
589,100
696,000
740,800
802,000
898,500
977,500
1,075,100
1,358,100
1,591,200
1,775,900
2,072,700
0.72
1.10
1.14
1.35
1.29
1. 18
1.69
1.88
2.18
2.23
1.99
1.76
2.16
2.11
2.01
2.00
3.17
2.79
2.67
2.61
2.15
0.23
0.12
0.36
0.61
0.51
0.50
0.19
0.12
0.39
0.37
0.28
0.73
0.70
0.61
0.6?
0.65
0.25
0.22
0.19
0.23
0.20
5,810
10,350
23,810
25,290
25,150
27,510
30,530
33,280
40,560
15,730
19,690
62,160
7.,710
81,520
91, 290
108,510
108,110
121,110
149,160
175,420
198,800
12.67
15.91
11.58
14.75
16.39
17.88
20.37
22.69
23.27
23.33
23.63
19.60
21.10
20.00
19.15
18.02
31.18
31.29
28.18
26.15
25.59
1.11
6.09
3.69
6.68
6.18
6.03
5.86
5.11
1.14
3.87
3.30
8.10
6.95
6.11
6.36
5.82
2.53
2.16
2.07
2.3?
2.09
5,543
10,118
18,503
21,352
21, 330
28,167
31,719
35,184
42,256
49,123
55,520
64,315
79,382
90,370
99,306
116,167
136,293
162,933
181,516
211,255
240,138
13.35
16.31
14.92
17.17
17.14
17.17
19.61
21.46
22.31
21.72
21.15
19.03
20.11
18.70
18.19
16.79
21.98
23.25
23.07
21.96
21.19
1.33
6.23
1.76
7.91
6.78
5.89
5.64
4.86
3.98
3.60
2.95
7.87
6.54
5.71
6.04
5.43
2.01
1.83
1.6?
1.96
1.73
X Revenues = Revenue account receipts
Sources: Report of Eighth Finance Cornission (1984): p. 156.
IMF International Financial Statistics (1988): p. 410.
APPENDIX III--Table A.III
FINANCE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS: TAX DEVOLUTION
(percent)
PLAN PERIOD INCOME TAX EXCISE DUTIES
% to Criteria % to Criteria
States Popn.* Colln.* States Popn. Bkwdness*
I 1951-56
II 1956-61
III 1961-66
AN-
NUAL
1966-69
IV 1969-74
V 1974-79
VI 1979-84
55
60
66
75
75
80
85
80
90
80
80
90
90
90
20
10
20
20
10
10
10
40,
on 3
goods
25,
on 8
goods
20,
on 35
goods
20,
on all
goods
20,
on all
goods
20,
on all
goods
40,
on all
goods
100 0
90 10
n.a. n.a.
80 20
80 20
75 25
25 75
* Popn.= Population, Colln.= Collection, and
Bkwdness.= Backwardness.
Sources: (i) Christine Wallich. State Finances
Revenue Sharing, (ii) Raja Chelliah. Trends in
Indian Federal Finance.
in India:
Issues in
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APPENDIX III--Table A.III (continued)
FINANCE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS: GRANTS
PLAN PERIOD GRANTS
Criteria & Awards
I 1951-56 1. Budgetary needs and the Revenue gap.
2. Help to States which faced additional burden
due to partition.
3. Assistance to less developed States with
special grants.
4. Grants for unforeseeable factors like relief
factors based on tax effort.
Recommended grants for 10 States.
II 1956-61 1. Requirements of the States for development
during Second Five-Year Plan.
2. Provision for uncertain contingencies.
3. Ad hoc assistance for border policing in
Assam for Naga disturbances.
4. Grants-in-aid for problems arising out of
reorganization of States.
Recommended grants for 11 States.
III 1961-66 1. Fiscal Needs, Non-Plan programs.
2. Short-term and long-term committed
expenditures.
3. Development of social services and
communication facilities.
4. Maintenance and upkeep of the existing Plan
projects.
5. 75% of the Revenue component of the Five-
Year Plan should be covered (the Union
Government did not accept this proposal).
Recommended grants for the development of
communication facilities: Rs. 90 million to
10 States. Recommended general grants for
14 States.
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Sources: Christine Wallich. State Finances in India: Revenue
Sharing.
APPENDIX III--Table A.III (concluded)
FINANCE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS: GRANTS
PLAN PERIOD
1966-69 1.
2.
GRANTS
Criteria & Awards
Did not make any specific grants.
Grants for debt servicing, keeping in view
expenditure and economy.
Recommended special grants for 6 States and
general grants for 10 States.
IV 1969-74
V 1974-79
VI 1979-84
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Did not favor specific grants.
States' needs on Revenue account.
The interest charges on their debt and the
maintenance and upkeep of Plan schemes
completed by 1968-69.
Fiscal management.
Special problems of certain States.
Provision for amortization or repayment of
debt including fresh borrowing from 1969-
70 to 1973-74.
Recommended grants for 10 States.
1. Closing budgetary gaps.
2. Grants for maintenance and upkeep of Plan
schemes completed by 1973-74.
3. Interest charges in respect of debt.
4. The requirements of certain States to
upgrade general administration.
5. Specific grants for social services and to
reduce regional disparities.
Recommended general grants for 19 States.
1. Closing budgetary gaps.
2. Grants for improvement of administrative
infrastructure.
3. Relief expenditure, if necessary.
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AN-
NUAL
Sources: Christine Wallich. State Finances in India: Revenue
Sharing.
APPENDIX IV--Table A.IV
SEVENTH FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS, BY STATE:
Income Taxes
DEVOLVED 1981 INCOME TAXES 1983 PER-
NO. STATE INCOME TAXES POPULATION RAISED (1979-84) CAPITA SDP
(Million Rs.) (millions) (Million Rs.) (Rs.)
1 Andhra Pradesh 4,165 53.55 1,845 2,146
2 Assam 1,309 19.90 517 1,886
3 Bihar 4,952 69.91 778 1,322
4 Gujarat 3,093 34.09 7,650 3,131
5 Haryana 944 12.92 678 2,993
6 Himachal Pradesh 309 4.28 98 2.253
7 Jammu & Kashmir 425 5.99 319 2,301
8 Karnataka 2,825 37.14 2,377 2,209
9 Kerala 2,050 25.45 1,509 2,069
10 Madhya Pradesh 3,818 52.18 1,395 1,840
11 Maharashtra 5,686 62.78 20,029 3,236
12 Manipur 98 1.42 35 1,728
13 Meghalaya 92 1.34 31 1,753
14 Nagaland 44 0.78 9 2,825
15 Orissa 1,941 26.37 320 1,927
16 Punjab 1,409 16.79 2,638 3,685
17 Rajasthan 2,265 34.26 1,332 1,967
18 Tamil Nadu 4,179 48.41 4,203 1,918
19 Tripura 134 2.05 21 1,772
20 Uttar Pradesh 8,009 110.86 3,339 1,518
21 West Bengal 4,162 54.58 4,487 2,196
TOTAL: 51,910 675.05 53,609
NOTES:
1. Since 1984, three new states have come into existence--Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Mizoram.
Sikkim is excluded because income taxes were not levied there during the period.
2. All figures are in current Rupees, unless otherwise specified.
SOURCES:
Report of Eighth Finance Commission (1984): p. 96, p. 150 (appdx), p.233 (appdx).
First Report of Ninth Finance Commission (1988): annexures V.3, V.5.
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APPENDIX IV (continued)
DEVOLVED INCOME TAXES REGRESSION
(1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant -61.1154
Std Err of Y Est 156.9450
R Squared 0.9956
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 17.0000
Popn. Tax Contribn. Per-cap. SDP
X Coefficient(s) 71.5246 0.0633 0.0325
Std Err of Coef. 1.62 0.01 0.08
T-Statistic 44.10 5.51 0.42
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APPENDIX V--Table A.V
SEVENTH FINANCE COMMISSION
Excise Duties
TRANSFERS, BY STATE:
DEVOLVED 1981 1983 PER- 1983 POVERTY
NO. STATE EXCISE DUTIES POPULATION CAPITA SDP PERCENT
(Million Rs.) (millions) (Rs.) (percent)
1 Andhra Pradesh 10,492 53.55 2,146 36.46%
2 Assam 3,807 19.90 1,886 23.82%
3 Bihar 17.753 69.91 1,322 49.76%
4 Gujarat 5,592 34.09 3,131 24.46%
5 Haryana 1,604 12.92 2.993 15.98%
6 Himachal Pradesh 710 4.28 2,253 13.56%
7 Jammu & Kashmir 1,144 5.99 2,301 16.37%
8 Karnataka 6,647 37.14 2,209 35.27%
9 Kerala 5,501 25.45 2,069 26.74%
10 Madhya Pradesh 11,895 52.18 1,840 46.50%
11 Maharashtra 9,041 62.78 3,236 35.17%
12 Manipur 297 1.42 1,728 12.73%
13 Meghalaya 273 1.34 1,753 28.50%
14 Nagaland 132 0.78 2,825 22.11%
15 Orissa 6,382 26.37 1,927 42.63%
16 Punjab 1,671 16.79 3,685 13.83%
17 Rajasthan 6,560 34.26 1,967 35.06%
18 Tamil Nadu 10,415 48.41 1,918 39.36%
19 Tripura 508 2.05 1,772 23.64%
20 Uttar Pradesh 24,933 110.86 1,518 45.56%
21 West Bengal 10,942 54.58 2,196 39.25%
TOTAL: 136,300 675.05
NOTES:
1. Since 1984, three new states have come into existence--Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Mizoram.
Sikkim is excluded because excise duties were not levied there during the period.
2. All figures are in current Rupees, unless otherwise specified.
SOURCES:
Report of Seventh Finance Commission (1978): p. 125
Report of Eighth Finance Commission (1984): p. 150 (appdx), p. 156 (appdx).
First Report of Ninth Finance Commission (1988): annexures V.3, V.5.
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APPENDIX V (continued)
DEVOLVED EXCISE DUTIES REGRESSION
(1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant 3523.6709
Std Err of Y Est 938.3628
R Squared 0.9819
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 17.0000
Popn. Per-cap. SDP Poverty Pct.
X Coefficient(s) 209.1195 -1.7665 572.6764
Std Err of Coef. 12.81 0.41 3465.24
T-Statistic 16.33 -4.30 0.17
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APPENDIX VI--Table A.VI
SEVENTH FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS, BY STATE:
Total Devolved Taxes
DEVOLVED YRLY DEVOLVED 1981 1983 PER- 1983 POVERTY
NO. STATE TAXES TAXES/ CAPITA POPULATION CAPITA SDP PERCENT
(Million Rs.) (Rs.) (millions) (Rs.) (percent)
1 Andhra Pradesh 15,029 561.30 53.55 2,146 36.46%
2 Assam 4,969 499.51 19.90 1,886 23.82%
3 Bihar 21,499 614.99 69.91 1,322 49.76%
4 Gujarat 9,639 565.55 34.09 3,131 24.46%
5 Haryana 3,086 477.59 12.92 2,993 15.98%
6 Himachal Pradesh 1,103 515.11 4.28 2,253 13.56%
7 Jammu & Kashmir 1,591 531.32 5.99 2,301 16.37%
8 Karnataka 10,050 541.25 37.14 2,209 35.27%
9 Kerala 7,662 602.00 25.45 2,069 26.74%
10 Madhya Pradesh 15,339 587.93 52.18 1,840 46.50%
11 Maharashtra 17,141 546.02 62.78 3,236 35.17%
12 Manipur 378 531.46 1.42 1,728 12.73%
13 Meghalaya 367 549.10 1.34 1,753 28.50%
14 Nagaland 179 462.19 0.78 2,825 22.11%
15 Orissa 8,153 618.33 26.37 1,927 42.63%
16 Punjab 4,195 499.77 16.79 3,685 13.83%
17 Rajasthan 8,835 515.74 34.26 1,967 35.06%
18 Tamil Nadu 14,764 609.98 48.41 1,918 39.36%
19 Tripura 597 581.20 2.05 1,772 23.64%
20 Uttar Pradesh 32,027 577.78 110.86 1,518 45.56%
21 West Bengal 15,726 576.26 54.58 2,196 39.25%
TOTAL: 192,326 675.05
NOTES:
1. Since 1984, three new states have come into existence--Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Mizoram.
Sikkim is excluded.
2. Grants include Revenue Gap grants, Upgradation Grants, and Margin Money Grants.
3. A 2.5 % population growth rate was assumed in calculating 1983 population, for the 1983
poverty percent estimate.
4. The Forecast Revenue (account) Deficit After Devolution (of taxes) is for the period 1979-84.
5. All figures are in current Rupees, unless otherwise specified.
SOURCES:
Report of Seventh Finance Commission (1978): pp. 88-89.
Report of Eighth Finance Commission (1984): p. 96, p. 150 (appdx.).
First Report of Ninth Finance Commission (1988): annexures V.3, V.5.
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APPENDIX VI (continued)
DEVOLVED TAXES REGRESSION
(1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant 224.7484
Std Err of Y Est 510.1469
R Squared 0.9968
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 17.0000
Popn. Per-cap. SDP Poverty Pct.
X Coefficient(s) 283.5254 -0.3690 2143.8438
Std Err of Coef. 6.96 0.22 1883.90
T-Statistic 40.72 -1.65 1.14
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APPENDIX VII--Table A.VII
INCOME TAX COLLECTIONS AND DEVOLUTIONS, BY STATE: (Seventh Commission Period)
INCOME TAX INCOME TAX
COLLECTION DEVOLUTION 1983 PER-
PER CAPITA PER CAPITA CAPITA SDP
NO. STATE (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.)
(1) (2) (3)
1 Andhra Pradesh 6.89 15.55 2,146
2 Assam 5.19 13.16 1,886
3 Bihar 2.22 14.17 1,322
4 Gujarat 44.89 18.15 3,131
5 Haryana 10.49 14.61 2,993
6 Himachal Pradesh 4.57 14.43 2,253
7 Jammu & Kashmir 10.67 14.18 2,301
8 Karnataka 12.80 15.21 2,209
9 Kerala 11.86 16.11 2,069
10 Madhya Pradesh 5.35 14.64 1,840
11 Maharashtra 63.80 18.11 3,236
12 Manipur 4.88 13.74 1,728
13 Meghalaya 4.67 13.83 1,753
14 Nagaland 2.19 11.39 2,825
15 Orissa 2.43 14.72 1,927
16 Punjab 31.42 16.78 3,685
17 Rajasthan 7.78 13.22 1,967
18 Tamil Nadu 17.37 17.26 1,918
19 Tripura 2.04 13.05 1,772
20 Uttar Pradesh 6.02 14.45 1,518
21 West Bengal 16.44 15.25 2,196
TOTAL:
NOTES:
1. Since 1984, three new states have come into existence--Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Mizoram.
Sikkim is excluded because income taxes were not levied there during the period.
2. All figures are in current Rupees, unless otherwise specified.
SOURCES:
Report of Eighth Finance Commission (1984): p. 96, p. 150 (appdx), p. 233 (appdx).
First Report of Ninth Finance Commission (1988): annexures V.3, V.5.
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APPENDIX VII (continued)
LOG-LOG REGRESSION OF TAX COLLECTIONS PER CAPITA
ON SDP PER CAPITA (1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant 
-16.9124
Std Err of Y Est 0.7411
R Squared 0.4424
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 19.0000
Log of Per-cap. SDP
X Coefficient(s) 2.4755
Std Err of Coef. 0.64
T-Statistic 3.88
LOG-LOG REGRESSION OF TAX DEVOLUTIONS PER CAPITA
ON SDP PER CAPITA (1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant 1.3322
Std Err of Y Est 0.1069
R Squared 0.1635
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 19.0000
Log of Per-cap. SDP
X Coefficient(s) 0.1773
Std Err of Coef. 0.09
T-Statistic 1.93
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APPENDIX VIII--Table A.VIII
SEVENTH FINANCE COMMISSION TRANSFERS, BY STATE:
Grants
FORECAST PERIOD
YRLY GRANTS/ 1981 1983 PER- 1983 POVERTY DEFICIT AFTER
NO. STATE GRANTS CAPITA POPULATION CAPITA SDP PERCENT DEVOLUTION
(Million Rs.) (Rs.) (millions) (Rs.) (percent) (Million Rs.)
1 Andhra Pradesh 196 7.32 53.55 2,146 36.46% 0
2 Assam 217 21.82 19.90 1,886 23.82% 0
3 Bihar 630 18.03 69.91 1,322 49.76% 0
4 Gujarat 0 0.00 34.09 3,131 24.46% 0
5 Haryana 0 0.00 12.92 2,993 15.98% 0
6 Himachal Pradesh 2,148 1003.55 4.28 2,253 13.56% 2,071
7 Jammu & Kashmir 2,178 727.71 5.99 2,301 16.37% 1,996
8 Karnataka 0 0.00 37.14 2,209 35.27% 0
9 Kerala 42 3.28 25.45 2,069 26.74% 0
10 Madhya Pradesh 636 24.37 52.18 1,840 46.50% 0
11 Maharashtra 0 0.00 62.78 3,236 35.17% 0
12 Manipur 1,563 2199.44 1.42 1,728 12.73% 1,463
13 Meghalaya 975 1459.13 1.34 1,753 28.50% 926
14 Nagaland 2,227 5746.58 0.78 2,825 22.11% 2,184
15 Orissa 1,692 128.31 26.37 1,927 42.63% 1,369
16 Punjab 0 0.00 16.79 3,685 13.83% 0
17 Rajasthan 193 11.26 34.26 1,967 35.06% 0
18 Tamil Nadu 272 11.24 48.41 1,918 39.36% 0
19 Tripura 1,402 1365.61 2.05 1,772 23.64% 1,366
20 Uttar Pradesh 1,120 20.21 110.86 1,518 45.56% 0
21 West Bengal 245 8.98 54.58 2,196 39.25% 0
TOTAL: 15,736 675.05
NOTES:
1. Since 1984, three new states have come into existence--Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Mizoram.
Sikkim has been excluded.
2. Grants include Revenue Gap grants, Upgradation Grants, and Margin Money Grants.
3. A 2.5 % population growth rate was assumed in calculating 1983 population, for the 1983 poverty pct. estimate.
4. The Forecast Revenue (account) Deficit After Devolution (of taxes) is for the period 1979-84.
5. All figures are in current Rupees, unless otherwise specified.
SOURCES:
Report of Seventh Finance Commission (1978): pp. 88-89.
Report of Eighth Finance Commission (1984): p. 96, p. 150 (appdx.).
First Report of Ninth Finance Commission (1988): annexures V.3, V.5.
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APPENDIX VIII
GRANTS REGRESSION
(1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant 371.3890
Std Err of Y Est 142.6317
R Squared 0.9751
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 16.0000
Popn. Per-capita SDP Poverty Pct. Rev. Deficit
X Coefficient(s) 9.3870 -0.1864 -346.3761 1.0966
Std Err of Coef. 2.13 0.07 530.61 0.05
T-Statistic 4.41 -2.84 -0.65 20.78
GRANTS (PER CAPITA) REGRESSION
(1979-84)
Regression Output:
Constant -1203.9061
Std Err of Y Est 1020.4186
R Squared 0.5328
No. of Observations 21.0000
Degrees of Freedom 16.0000
Popn. Per-capita SDP Poverty Pct. Rev. Deficit
X Coefficient(s) -6.0662 0.3580 1923.4273 1.1756
Std Err of Coef. 15.23 0.47 3796.07 0.38
T-Statistic -0.40 0.76 0.51 3.11
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